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Abstract
Unlike some areas of crime, participation in illicit tobacco markets is not rare and spans most
sociodemographic groups. Measurement of the scale of illicit trade in cigarettes usually are for markets
with recently increased (or continually increasing) excise taxes. This study examines survey data from
adult cigarette smokers in California at a time when prices and taxes had been fairly stable for many years.
Even with no recent price shocks in the market, the results indicate that one-third of cigarette packs may
lack a valid tax stamp and that between 18% to 25% of smokers avoided taxes by bringing cigarettes into
the state from elsewhere in the past month (36% in the past year). Over 10% of packs were purchased for
a suspiciously low price and 24% to 32% of smokers think they might have bought untaxed cigarettes in
the past month. Furthermore, 20% think they may have consumed counterfeit cigarettes in the past
month. There is a low incidence of illegal sales of single cigarettes. Men, smokers who roll their own
cigarettes, e-cigarette users, younger smokers, and those with more income and education are all more
likely to engage in at least some of the suspect market behaviors examined. The results show that many
smokers from all segments of society participate in the illicit market for cigarettes—wittingly or not—
which complicates efforts to reduce illicit trade.
Keywords: illicit trade in tobacco products, counterfeit cigarettes, tax evasion, item count technique
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I.

Introduction
Many studies of crime and criminals are motivated by the fascination with the “other,” whether

explicitly as in the older criminological approaches of symbolic interactionism and labeling theory
(Denzin, 1974; Goode, 2014) or tacitly today.1 Most people are not criminals and therefore questions
about the correlates of criminal behavior are part of the search for why these individuals are different
from those who live in conformity with laws and the social norms of the dominant group (e.g., the
approach in psychology of contrasting criminals with “normal” controls, as in Sinha (2016), or
Durkheim’s (1984) sociological notion of asocial criminal deviance rooted in anomie). Even theories
linking crime to culture, as in social-structure and sociological positivist theories of crime in sociology
and cultural criminology, while recognizing that criminals may hold their own set of rules and social
values, still typically discuss them as a sub-culture (Tonkonoff, 2014). Furthermore, the act of offending
is typically described as rare and the length of the time spent offending as short (Curiel, 2018; Van
Halem et al., 2016). Exceptions to these conceptions of crime therefore are interesting to study. This
study considers an area of law-breaking that is measured to be relatively common, engaged in by a
cross-section of society that spans gender, income, race, and ethnicity, and (for a certain definition of
“offending”) occurs up to 20 or more times a day per offender: tax evasion and consumer participation
in illicit markets for cigarettes.
To discourage smoking, lessen harm to public health, and raise revenue in a manner that enjoys
wide popular support, most governments tax tobacco products. Tobacco tax rates are often among the
highest for any taxed item (good, service, labor or other forms of income, or capital gains) in a nation or
subnational jurisdiction. Even in the United States, where tobacco taxes are lower than in parts of the
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world such as Europe that follow the World Health Organization’s (2021) recommendation that taxes
compose at least 75% of the retail price of cigarettes, federal and state taxes make up between 23% and
57% of the retail price of a pack (Orzechowski & Walker, 2020). The high taxes create an incentive for
consumers of tobacco to avoid and evade taxes through casual bootlegging involving travel to lowertaxed jurisdictions or purchasing from illicit markets, whether sourced through the internet, under-thetable transactions from otherwise legitimate retailers, or on the street (Guindon et al., 2014; Joossens &
Raw, 2012; Kulick, 2017). Participating in illicit markets for cigarettes is widely accepted in certain
communities (Shelley et al., 2007; Stead et al., 2013), even though the search for untaxed cigarettes can
expose buyers to counterfeit tobacco products. Euromonitor (2021) estimates that 8% of cigarettes
consumed worldwide in 2020 were illicit. For the U.S., estimates of illicit sales of cigarettes range from
4% to 21% market share (Reuter and Majmundar, 2015; Kulick et al., 2016). One source estimates that
about a third of cigarettes consumed in California, the location of the present study, are from sources
outside the state, and thus involves tax avoidance, tax evasion, or direct participation in underground
markets (LaFaive et al., 2018).
Participation in illicit tobacco markets has received relatively little attention from researchers in
criminology, compared with other areas of crime (Aziani et al., 2021), despite the fact that ITTP has been
linked to terrorism and organized crime. 2 On the other hand, there are many studies of particular
countries or regions estimating the level of illicit activity in tobacco sales, most often by economists or

2

ITTP in the U.S. has been linked to criminal organizations ranging from small gangs to the Genovese,

DeCavalcante, and other crime families of La Casa Nostra and international smuggling rings (Bender & Palmer,
2016, US Attorney, 2015; Genovese family mobsters, 2012). In California, in 2005 the FBI took down an Asian
smuggling ring for importing counterfeit cigarettes and other crimes (FBI, 2005). ITTP has also been linked in
various ways to al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIL, FARC, and other terrorist groups (Exploring the Financial Nexus,
2018). However, much ITTP also appears to be perpetrated by nonviolent individuals without otherwise-criminal
backgrounds (Beare, 2002).
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public health researchers, but they typically examine either periods shortly after a tax increase or
jurisdictions in which there are frequent and continual tax increases. 3 Illicit trade in cigarettes—typically
defined to consist of trade in smuggled, untaxed, contraband legitimate or counterfeit product—is often
measured to be low after a tax increase (Little et al., 2020; Maldonado et al., 2020), to have changed
little (Kaplan et al., 2018; van der Zee et al., 2020), or even to have fallen (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020). It
can take time for criminal markets to form or expand, however, or for consumers to adjust their
behavior toward illicit markets. A particularly little-studied question is the prevalence and correlates of
tax evasion and illicit trade in tobacco markets with stable taxes and prices, which is the present focus.
This study investigates the crimes of evading excise taxes on cigarettes and illicit trade in
tobacco products (ITTP), as well as tax avoidance. 4 We employ novel survey data from smokers in
California to estimate the prevalence of tax evasion, ITTP, and tax avoidance and to explore
demographic factors associated with their prevalence. At the time of the survey in early 2017, there had
been no increase in the excise tax on cigarettes sold in the state since 2009, when the federal tax rose
by $0.62 per pack, and there had been no state cigarette tax increase since 1999. Cigarette prices were
level or declining in real terms since 2009 and excise tax as a fraction of average retail price remained

3

Studies performed after a tax increase include, e.g., Maldonado et al. (2020) for Colombia, Little et al. (2020) for

Georgia, Nguyen & Nguyen (2020) for Vietnam, and Kaplan et al. (2018) for Turkey. Studies of regions with
frequent tax increases include Aziani et al. (2020) and Prieger & Kulick (2018) for Europe, Calderoni (2014) for Italy,
Chionis & Chalkia (2016) for Greece, and Vellios et al. (2020) for South Africa.
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The distinction commonplace in the tax compliance literature is to use the term evasion to refer to illegal activity

and avoidance to refer to (at least nominally) legal actions taken to escape taxation. However, as will be described
below, the measure called tax avoidance studied here may also involve lawbreaking.
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mostly steady as around one-third, 5 enabling study of a stable (albeit slightly shrinking) 6 market with
only a moderately high level of taxation. We find that some forms of tax avoidance, evasion, and ITTP
are relatively common. A self-reported one-third of packs lacks a valid California tax stamp. Between
18% to 25% of smokers in California avoided taxes in the past month by bringing cigarettes into the state
from elsewhere and that 36% of them engaged in tax avoidance in the past year. Over 10% of currently
smoked packs were purchased for a suspiciously low price and between 24% and 32% of smokers think
they might have bought untaxed cigarettes in the past month. Furthermore, 20% think they may have
consumed counterfeit cigarettes in the past month.
The present work adds to the literature on participation in illicit markets. The focus here is on
measuring prevalence and characterizing participants on the demand side of the market, since the
supply side has received much more attention in the criminology literature (Barrera et al., 2019; Beare,
2002; Décary-Hétu et al., 2018; Lauchs and Keane 2017; Munksgaard et al., 2021; van Duyne, 2003). 7
However, the survey results also indirectly reveal information about illicit supply by asking about
untaxed sales and the (typically unwitting) purchase of counterfeit cigarettes. Only a few quantitative
studies of individuals are available regarding the correlates of participation in illicit tobacco markets
(Cantrell et al., 2008; Joossens et al., 2014; van der Zee et al., 2020). There is more work, mainly by
economists, on tobacco-tax avoidance by individuals, which may or may not involve law-breaking. 8 Most
studies of individual who evade taxes study income taxes only (e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
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From November 2009 to November 2016, the average price per pack sold in California rose 10.2% (Orzechowski

& Walker, 2020), while the consumer price index for all goods and services (CPI-U) rose 11.4%. The federal and
state excise tax as a percentage of average retail price was 31.6% in 1999 and 33.5% in 2016, although it briefly
rose to 37% in 2009 when the federal tax increased.
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In 2009, adults smoking prevalence was 13.6%; in 2016 is was 11.9% (data taken from the California Health

Interview Survey; see ask.chis.ucla.edu).
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See also the many citations to earlier literature in Aziani et al. (2018).
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See DeCicca, Kenkel, & Liu (2013) and the many other studies cited in Prieger & Kulick (2018).
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Slemrod, 2007). Finally, there is a literature on why consumers turn to markets for counterfeit goods
(Eisend & Schuchert-Güler, 2006; Bian & Moutinho, 2009; Casola et al., 2009; Bian et al., 2016). Unlike
these studies, which typically involve stated preferences, we examine data on actual market
transactions (albeit self-reported). Another contrast is that unlike for luxury consumer goods such as
handbags, smokers typically do not want to buy counterfeit cigarettes. 9
We examine many demographic factors associated with purchase of counterfeits and other
forms of ITTP and tax evasion. Although the results vary across the market activities, generally speaking
men, younger smokers, those with higher income, high-volume smokers, and consumers of menthol
cigarettes and e-cigarettes are more likely to engage in some of the suspect behaviors examined.
Compared to black, Hispanic, and Asian smokers, white smokers have a lower prevalence of packs
without a proper tax stamp, illicit single cigarette purchases, tax avoidance, and purchase of untaxed
and suspected counterfeit cigarettes. Black smokers have the highest prevalence of packs without
proper tax stamps and purchase of suspected counterfeit cigarettes. Asian and Native American smokers
have the highest prevalence of tax avoidance, and the latter group has the highest prevalence of crossstate tax evasion and purchase of untaxed cigarettes. The most striking result, however, is that packs
without proper tax stamps, tax avoidance, and buying untaxed or counterfeit cigarettes are relatively
widespread across all demographic groups, however defined.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the survey instrument and the methods
of analysis. Section III presents the results for the prevalence of ITTP, tax avoidance, and tax evasion and
also examines how smoking behavior and demographic factors are associated with tax avoidance. A final
section summarizes and discusses the results.

9

Counterfeit cigarettes taste “stale”, “nasty”, and “disgusting,” and are more likely to give the smoker headaches

and a sore throat (Von Lampe et al., 2016).
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II.

Methods
To measure smokers’ behavior regarding tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP, 4,934 adult

smokers were surveyed in March 2017. 10 The target population of the online survey was current
smokers in California aged 18 to 74 who are literate in English. Survey weights were computed to match
the demographics of target population, and all estimates of proportions to follow are weighted and the
confidence intervals account for the impact of the weights on the variance of the estimates. The online
appendix shows that the survey represents a typical sample of smokers in terms of smoking intensity,
brand choice, and use of e-cigarettes, and that after weighting the demographics of the sample
generally align with the demographics of the target population. Estimates are computed with Stata 17.
The descriptive estimates are free from overt bias due to differences in the distribution of
demographics factors accounted for by the weights, but the estimates are potentially susceptible to
other sources of bias. If tobacco users do not report their behavior truthfully, there will be bias in the
estimates for the population. Self-reports of tobacco use have been shown to be generally reliable and
valid in the past (Velicer et al., 1992; Patrick et al., 1994), with the exception that frequency of use is
underreported, but there is evidence that underreporting of tobacco consumption is rising as smoking
becomes more stigmatized (Fendrich et al., 2005). Online surveys may elicit more accurate selfreporting. Ramo et al. (2011) find that reported frequency of smoking is higher in online surveys and
suggest that “the relative anonymity of online or electronic questionnaires may lessen social desirability
bias…, as there are no interviewer effects.” Thus, online surveying may be an effective tool to overcome
the tendency to underreport tobacco use.
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The survey was commissioned by BOTEC Analysis, and was issued a certificate of exemption by the Western

Institutional Review Board due to the anonymity of the respondents. The survey ran from March 10 to March 30,
2017. For more information about the survey, including the script, see the online appendix.
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Despite some advantages over traditional survey modes, Internet-based surveys are subject to
concerns about self-selection bias if the online panels of respondents differ systematically in their
behavior compared to other smokers. However, information on smoking gathered by online surveying
has been found to have strong reliability and validity and to be comparable to face-to-face modes of
interviewing (Klein, Thomas, & Sutter, 2007) and research employing online panels to study smokers’
attitudes and behavior has been published in top public health journals (e.g., Thrasher et al., 2015).
To further immunize against social-desirability bias, for two questions regarding potentially
sensitive subjects the survey employed the item count technique (ICT) technique (Droitcour et al., 1991;
Dalton et al., 1994). ICT, also known as the unmatched-count technique (UCT), is a method designed to
elicit truthful responses to sensitive questions, and generally has been found in the literature to work
well (Tsuchiya et al., 2007; Coutts & Jann, 2011). A control sample of half the respondents are presented
with a short list of non-threatening behaviors and asked only the total number of how many they did in
the past month. 11 The remaining respondents compose the treatment group, who are shown the same
list but with the sensitive behavior of interest added, and asked the same question. Since respondents
are not asked to admit to doing any particular one of the items on the list, the psychic cost of truthful
reporting is likely low even if some items are sensitive. The difference in the mean counts between the
treatment and control groups is the estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive behavior. The sensitive
behaviors explored here are bringing cigarettes from out of state into California and purchasing untaxed
cigarettes from legitimate retailers, the Internet, or on the street. 12 These questions were answered
before respondents knew the survey would ask about tax avoidance, evasion, or ITTP.

11

See survey questions 3 and 4 in the online appendix.
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The exact wording of the first item was: “Brought cigarettes into California that were purchased outside the

state”. The second item was: “Have bought cheap (untaxed) cigarettes or from an individual selling them
independently.”
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III.

Measures of tax evasion and ITTP
The survey asked respondents about a number of practices related to tax avoidance, tax

evasion, and ITTP. With one exception, none of our survey questions asks directly about illegal behavior
on the part of the respondents. In California, the crimes involved with ITTP are only on the part of the
seller. That is, there is no law against buying untaxed or counterfeit cigarettes in California; the laws
criminalize only the sale of such. 13 The exception is our question about California taxes paid on
cigarettes purchased from out of the state. When bringing more than 400 cigarettes into the state the
buyer bears the legal obligation to pay the excise tax and a “use tax” in lieu of the sales tax, although the
obligation is virtually unenforceable. Some buyers may seek out untaxed product or bootleg from
outside the state, while others may buy counterfeit or untaxed tobacco unawares. Furthermore, in most
cases the product itself is legitimate and legal (apart from the tax issues). As Vander Beken et al. (2008)
put it, ITTP and its participants “blur the line between criminality and non-criminality.”
We collected measures of tax avoidance, evasion, and ITTP as a set of variables, some pertaining
to the current pack being smoked and others pertaining to behavior in the past 30 days or year.
Measures pertaining to the current cigarettes being smoked include whether the pack has a proper tax
stamp, whether the cigarettes were purchased singly as “loosies” (which is illegal on the part of the
seller), and whether the reported price paid for a premium brand was lower than would be likely if taxes
were included. 14

13

The same is true of including underage smokers in the survey (those of age 18 to 20). While it is illegal to sell

cigarettes to persons under the age of 21 in the state (outside of military bases), there is no law against
consumption by those under 21.
14

The price threshold is $4, a conservative one for fully taxed premium-branded cigarettes. Per numbeo.com, a

pack of Marlboro cigarettes costs at least $6 in California in early 2017, and much more in some cities. However,
the state sets no minimum retail price for cigarettes and below-cost coupons are not prohibited (Tobacconomics,
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Table 3 shows the names and definitions of the behaviors we investigate by direct questioning.
Each is a binary variable, and the table shows their proportions in the sample and estimated proportions
in the population. The estimates of the population proportions, which are also shown in Figure 3, range
from 0.6% (for the currently smoked cigarettes being purchased as loosies) to 35.7% for tax avoidance
by purchasing outside the state in the past year (variable TaxAvoidance). For packs being currently
smoked, 31.6% lack a stamp that looks correct to the respondent (NoStamp2; based on a picture
presented in the survey), a high proportion but in line with other estimates of untaxed consumption in
California (LaFaive et al., 2018). However, only 6.7% of packs were purchased within the state but have
no California stamp at all (real or counterfeit; variable NoStamp1). 15 The other measures with high
incidence include a prevalence of 23.6% for Untaxed (having possibly bought untaxed cigarettes in the
past 30 days) 16 and 19.8% for Counterfeit (having possibly bought counterfeit cigarettes in the past 30
days). 17 While the latter figure may seem implausibly large, the implied probability that any one pack is
counterfeit is only 1.3% (with a 95% confidence interval of [1.2, 1.5]). 18

2016), so some off-brand cigarettes could potentially be sold legally for less than $4. For this reason the variable
PriceTooLow is calculated only for the subpopulation whose usual brand is premium.
15

The large difference between the means of NoStamp1 and NoStamp2 suggests a substantial amount of poorly

counterfeited stamps. However, it may be the case that respondents had difficulty seeing the detail on the tax
stamps on their packs well, since they are small (21 mm by 13 mm). Both of these variables miss the possibility that
a pack with another state’s stamp affixed was purchased within California, a feature of the survey questions that
may bias these measures downward.
16

For Untaxed, this figure breaks down as 14.4% “yes” and 9.2% “maybe.” See survey question 36 in the appendix.
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For Counterfeit, this figure breaks down as 9.7% “yes” and 10.1% “maybe.”
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Let the probability that a pack is counterfeit be p, let the number of packs consumed per month by respondent i

by ni, and let yi be 1 if at least one pack consumed in the month is counterfeit (yi = 0 otherwise). Then the
probability that yi = 1, based on the binomial distribution, is [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ]. From this expression we calculated

the weighted maximum likelihood estimate of p from the data, which is 0.0133 (SE = 0.0006). This calculation

assumes that the probability of encountering counterfeits is the same for all smokers and that consumers purchase
them randomly instead of intentionally.

9

There is a large discrepancy between the prevalences of TaxAvoidance and TaxEvasion. Some of
the difference is because the former question asked about any purchases outside the state while the
latter asked about buying more than 400 cigarettes (20 packs or two cartons). It is important to note
that the TaxEvasion measure therefore likely greatly underestimates actual tax evasion, since the 20pack threshold triggering the tax obligation applies only to the excise tax; the use tax obligation in lieu of
sales taxes applies to any packs brought back into the state.
The proportions estimated from the direct questions can be compared with the prevalences
estimated from the item count technique. Using the ICT, the incidence of purchasing cigarettes outside
California and bringing them into the state in the past 30 days is 23.5% [15.9, 31.1]. 19 These are close to
but larger than the estimates from the similar answer to a direct question (18.5% [17.0, 20.0]). 20 Thus
the ICT estimates for the population are 27% (5 percentage points) higher than the direct-question
estimates. The estimates from the ICT are expected to be larger if the method improved the candor of
the respondents. There is thus some evidence of underreporting in answers to the direct question. For
the second question asked via the ICT, the estimate of the incidence of buying untaxed cigarettes in the
past 30 days is 31.9% [23.8, 39.9]. The figures from the similar direct question (variable Untaxed in Table
3) is 23.6% [22.0, 25.3] for the population estimate (as reported in Table 3). The discrepancy between
the ICT and direct estimates is larger than for the previous question; the ICT estimates are about 35%
higher than the direct estimates. Note that the item in the ICT question was stated definitely and
focused on the action of the buyer (see footnote 12) while the measure from the direct question
includes answers of “maybe” purchasing untaxed cigarettes and is focused more on the sellers (see

19

The estimates are the difference in mean counts between the control and treatment groups (Tsuchiya et al.,

2007). All figures in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
20

The relevant direct measure is from answer 33.1 to question 33 (see the appendix), calculated as a proportion

out of those not answering “Don’t know/Can’t say.”
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footnote 16). If the direct question were identical to the ICT question the difference in the estimated
prevalence of buying untaxed cigarettes would likely be even larger.

IV.

Correlates of tax evasion and ITTP
The associations among various smoking and vaping behaviors and the measures of

questionable market activity are shown in Table 4 and Table 5. Only statistically significant associations
are discussed here. 21 Heavier smokers are more likely to report paying a suspiciously low price for
premium cigarettes (PriceTooLow in Table 4), to avoid (TaxAvoidance) and evade (TaxEvasion) taxes in
the past year (Table 5), and to possibly have purchased untaxed (Untaxed) and counterfeit (Counterfeit)
product in the past 30 days. For the latter four outcomes in Table 5, smokers who roll their own
cigarettes or who have no brand preference 22 have the highest proportions, followed generally by
smokers of premium cigarettes. In addition, smokers in the roll-your-own (RYO)/no brand preference
category are most likely to have bought loosies.
Compared to smokers of unflavored cigarettes, smokers of menthol cigarettes were less likely to
have a proper California tax stamp on their latest pack (NoStamp2), and more likely to have purchased
loosies or to have avoided cigarette taxes (TaxAvoidance). Menthol smokers were also more likely to
have purchased possibly counterfeit cigarettes. While Marlboro is the most counterfeited brand in the

21

Significance is assessed with a Pearson chi-square test for independence of the smoking, demographic factor, or

economic variable and the response in question.
22

Most of the 403 respondents in the category of RYO/no brand preference roll their own cigarettes. The rest (103

respondents) answered that they had no regular brand of cigarettes that they smoked the most.
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world (WCO, 2014) 23 and most Marlboros sold are not mentholated, 24 there are also many reports of
counterfeit Newport menthol cigarettes in the United States (e.g., USDOJ, 2016).
Compared to smokers who do not vape, users of e-cigarettes 25 are less likely to have a proper
tax stamp on their current pack (NoStamp1), and more likely to have paid less than $4 for their
premium-brand pack (PriceTooLow) and to have evaded taxes (TaxEvasion). Dual users are twice as
likely to report avoiding taxes and three times as likely to report having purchased possibly untaxed or
counterfeit product as cigarette-only smokers.
Table 6 and Table 7 show the associations among various demographic factors and tax evasion,
tax avoidance, and ITTP. Compared to women, male smokers are far more likely to engage in behaviors
PriceTooLow, TaxAvoidance, TaxEvasion, Untaxed, and Counterfeit. This is consistent with earlier
findings that men are more prone than women to evade other sorts of taxes (Baldry, 1987; Torgler,
2007, p.34).
Older smokers are more likely to report that their current pack did not have a proper tax stamp
(NoStamp1 and NoStamp1), in accord with DeCicca et al.’s (2013) similar finding that older people are
more likely to cross a border to buy cigarettes. However, it may also be that it was more difficult for
older respondents in our survey to see the stamps. 26 In contrast, all other behaviors in Tables 6 and 7
are most prevalent for those in the 21-to-24 age group, with the youngest smokers (18–20 years old)
most often coming in second.

23

The Marlboro brand dummy is positively associated with Counterfeit but only at the 10% level, perhaps because

Philip Morris USA, the manufacturer, cracked down on then-prevalent counterfeiting in California in the 2000s
(Strasburg, 2003).
24

Among survey respondents who smoke Marlboro cigarettes, non-menthol smokers outnumber menthol smokers

by about three to one.
25

Since the target population is smokers, vapers who do not also smoke are not in the survey.

26

The survey showed an enlarged picture of a California tax stamp, but the actual stamps on the packs are only 21

mm by 13 mm.
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Compared to whites, NoStamp2 and Untaxed are more prevalent among blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, and Native Americans. Blacks have the highest odds, by many multiples, 27 of buying loosies,
although the overall prevalence is still low (2.7%). Compared to whites and blacks, TaxAvoidance and
TaxEvasion are more likely among Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians
are most likely to report running across possibly counterfeit cigarettes.
Those without a high-school diploma are most likely to buy loosies, pay a suspiciously low price,
or buy suspected counterfeits. Those with college or higher degrees have the greatest probability of
NoStamp2, TaxAvoidance, and TaxEvasion. For PriceTooLow, Untaxed and Counterfeit, the lowest and
the highest educational-attainment groups have the highest prevalence. The lack of consistent,
monotonic relationships between educational attainment and tax compliance may stem from
competing results from education. Higher education may correspond to a greater stake in conventional
behavior or more knowledge of the social good provided by tax revenue (which may include funding for
tobacco-control measures in the case of excise taxes on cigarettes). But the more educated may better
understand the opportunities for and benefits of noncompliance (Torgler, 2007). With all these results,
however, it is important to note that there are only a few individuals in the survey without a high-school
degree and the confidence intervals for that group are wide.
Education is also correlated with income. 28 Among respondents who stated their income levels,
smokers with household income less than $25,000/year are most likely to buy loosies. For PriceTooLow,
TaxAvoidance, TaxEvasion, and Untaxed, the prevalence rises monotonically with income. DeCicca et al.
(2013) had a similar result for border-crossing to buy cigarettes. Interestingly, Counterfeit is most likely
for the highest income group (more than $75,000/year).

27

The odds ratio of blacks (relative to whites) for buying loosies is 11.8.

28

Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma (a measure of rank correlation) for the income and education categories is

0.706.
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Notwithstanding the discussion of how the prevalence of the various measures related to ITTP
varies by smoking behavior and among demographic groups, it is important to note that several of the
measures have high prevalences across all groups. For example, NoStamp2 has a prevalence of almost
one in five for the lowest-prevalence ethnic group, over a quarter of the lowest-prevalence age group
engages in TaxAvoidance, even one in six women think they bought Untaxed product, and the lowestprevalence education and income groups have a prevalence of Counterfeit of over 16%.

V.

Summary and discussion
A significant proportion of the smoking population in California engages in tax avoidance (36% in

the past year), but far fewer admit to outright tax evasion by getting large numbers of cigarettes outside
the state, bringing them home, and failing to pay use tax (only 3% in the past year). When asked in a
more neutral fashion, however—asking whether they had purchased from sellers who did not pay
taxes—many more thought that they were exposed to ITTP (27% in the past month). Tax avoidance and
evasion appear to be more prevalent, with increases in the range of 27% to 35% versus direct
questioning, when estimated using an honesty-inducing technique (ICT). Some forms of ITTP are less
common: fewer than 7% of packs purchased in the state had no California tax stamp at all, fewer than
1% of the last-smoked cigarettes were purchased as illegally-sold single cigarettes, and the implied
probability that a randomly selected pack is counterfeit is estimated to be only 1.3%. In summary, while
the only direct estimate of the prevalence of admitted illegal behavior on the part of the consumers—
outright tax evasion on large purchases from outside the state—is low, there appears to have been a
moderately sized illicit market in cigarettes in California, notwithstanding that there had been no
significant increases in taxes or prices in many years.
The correlates of the suspect behaviors examined here suggest that tax evasion and exposure to
ITTP, while more common for some groups, span all demographic groups to some degree. Smokers who
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roll their own cigarettes and vapers have a higher prevalence of some of the suspect behaviors. Vaping
and RYO may be prompted by the same desire to lower the cost of smoking that prompts tax avoidance,
and equivalently high taxes on those goods may discourage substitution away from illicit markets.
Younger people also appear more willing to seek out untaxed cigarettes and to encounter counterfeits.
One policy implication may be that youth-oriented messaging to counter ITTP on the demand side may
be a useful avenue to explore, although experience with illicit drug markets has shown that it can be
difficult to design effective messaging (Hornik et al., 2008).
Given the focus in the literature on ITTP in certain low-income communities (Shelley et al., 2007;
Von Lampe et al., 2016), it is interesting that income is positively associated with most forms of tax
avoidance and evasion studied here (except buying single cigaretts). Higher-income smokers may have
more opportunity to buy untaxed or lower-taxed cigarettes while traveling. The results for income,
along with the finding that those with high educational attainment also have a high prevalence of some
forms of tax evasion, suggest that exposure to ITTP is not restricted to less-affluent price searchers or
the stereotypical “criminal classes”.
That well-educated and higher-income smokers as well as more disadvantaged smokers engage
in tax avoidance and evasion may signal any number of widespread attitudes that would make
counteracting ITTP difficult. Such attitudes may include the feeling that tobacco taxes unfairly target
smokers, a robust finding in surveys of smokers (Carlson, 2005; Dugan 2014; Saad, 2002), or that
evading “sin taxes” is a victimless crime or otherwise morally acceptable. Participation in ITTP (on both
sides of the market) can occupy a “moral blind spot” for these reasons (Vander Beken et al., 2008), and
tobacco excise taxes are often viewed as more illegitimate that efforts to evade them (i.e., as “hurdles
to avoid rather than moral imperatives to obey”; Beare, 2002). The perceived unfairness of tobacco
taxes has also been shown to help smokers rationalize cheating others (Kenchington et al., 2021).
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Regardless of the reasons for involvement, it is clear that ITTP is an area of crime that includes
participants from across society and is neither rare across individuals nor necessarily involving only
short, isolated periods of offending for individuals involved (as long as the act of smoking untaxed
cigarettes is included in the notion of offending). Other research has found that many traders and
smugglers on the supply side of ITTP—“criminal entrepreneurs”—often do not have criminal
backgrounds otherwise (Van Duyne, 2003). Participants on both sides of ITTP appear to be best
characterized as not the “other” but rather “another one of us” who uses a variety of ways, legal and
illegal, to try to reduce the cost of smoking.
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Table 1: Behavior regarding tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP

Variable
NoStamp1
NoStamp2
Loosies
PriceTooLow

Description
Current pack was purchased in CA but lacks
any type of CA stamp
Current pack was purchased in CA but lacks a
stamp matching a picture of a valid stamp
Current cigarettes were purchased as singles
(loosies)
Price paid for current pack was less than $4

Bought cigarettes outside CA and brought
them into CA in the past year, or last pack
doesn’t have a CA stamp of any kind
TaxEvasion
Bought more than 400 cigarettes outside CA
and brought them into CA in the past year and
did not pay use tax
Untaxed
Bought untaxed cigarettes in the past 30 days
(“yes” or “maybe”)
Counterfeit
Bought counterfeit cigarettes in the past 30
days (“yes” or “maybe”)
Notes: The population estimates use the survey weights.

Proportions

Sample

Population
estimate

95% CI for pop.
estimate

Subpopulation

6.15

6.69

[5.52,8.09]

Packs with intact wrapper

29.50

31.58

[29.35,33.89]

Packs with intact wrapper

0.61

0.62

[0.37,1.04]

12.02

10.55

[9.44,11.78]

39.91

35.74

[33.88,37.63]

3.04

3.39

[2.72,4.20]

26.77

23.62

[21.98,25.34]

Not “don’t know/can’t say”

22.46

19.81

[18.25,21.47]

Not “don’t know/can’t say”

TaxAvoidance

Not “don’t know/refuse to
answer”
Premium-brand packs with
price known
Not “don’t know/can’t
say,” unless current pack is
missing a CA stamp
Not “don’t know/can’t say”
for location of purchase
AND same for use tax.
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Table 2: Behavioral factors and association with tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP, I
NoStamp1
NoStamp2

Loosies

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

Cigarettes/day
Up to 5
6 - 10
11 - 15
16 - 24
25 - 35
36 or more

7.50
6.30
6.20
8.30
3.00
3.00

[5.5,10.3]
[4.3,9.1]
[4.0,9.5]
[5.2,13.0]
[1.2,7.2]
[0.8,11.0]

34.50
32.10
30.20
29.70
28.00
23.90

[30.0,39.4]
[28.0,36.5]
[25.6,35.1]
[24.5,35.4]
[18.9,39.4]
[13.5,38.8]

1.30
0.50
0.20
0.20
0.00
0.50

[0.7,2.2]
[0.1,2.2]
[0.0,1.0]
[0.0,1.3]

Brand type
Discount
Premium†
Roll your own/none‡

8.20
6.40
8.00

[4.9,13.5]
[5.1,7.9]
[4.1,14.9]

33.10
30.80
38.60

[26.0,41.1]
[28.4,33.3]
[29.6,48.5]

Cig. flavor
Non-menthol
Menthol

6.40
7.40

[5.0,8.2]
[5.3,10.1]

29.90*
35.30*

Vaping
No vaping/e-cig use
Vapes/uses e-cigs

7.30
4.70

[5.9,8.9]
[2.9,7.5]

31.60
31.30

PriceTooLow

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

[0.1,3.5]

11.40**
8.60**
9.10**
10.60**
10.00**
34.40**

[9.5,13.7]
[6.7,10.8]
[6.9,11.8]
[7.7,14.5]
[5.7,16.9]
[23.6,47.2]

1.10**
0.30**
3.10**

[0.4,3.0]
[0.1,0.5]
[1.2,7.4]

0.00**
12.80**
0.00**

[11.5,14.3]

[27.1,32.8]
[31.2,39.6]

0.40
1.00

[0.2,0.8]
[0.5,2.3]

10.90
9.60

[9.4,12.5]
[7.8,11.7]

[29.1,34.4]
[27.2,35.8]

0.50
1.20

[0.2,0.9]
[0.6,2.5]

8.00**
19.60**

[6.9,9.3]
[16.7,22.9]

95% CI

**
Pearson chi-square test statistic for independence of factors and responses has p-value less than 0.05.
Chi-square p-value less than 0.01.
For list of premium brands, see footnote Error! Bookmark not defined..
‡
Category includes those who mostly roll their own cigarettes and those who have no usual brand preference of pre-packaged cigarettes.
Note: Estimates are for the percentage of smokers in the subpopulation defined by the row heading for which the variable in the column heading equals one.
*
†
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Table 3: Behavioral factors and association with tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP, II
TaxAvoidance
TaxEvasion
Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Cigarettes/day
Up to 5
6 - 10
11 - 15
16 - 24
25 - 35
36 or more

39.80**
29.80**
32.00**
40.80**
36.30**
57.90**

[36.3,43.3]
[26.6,33.2]
[28.1,36.1]
[35.7,46.1]
[26.8,47.0]
[44.0,70.6]

Brand type
Discount
Premium†
Roll your own/none‡

27.00**
35.80**
42.20**

Cig. flavor
Non-menthol
Menthol
Vaping
No vaping/e-cig use
Vapes/uses e-cigs

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

3.20*
2.40*
3.00*
6.20*
3.70*
2.50*

[2.1,4.7]
[1.5,4.0]
[1.8,4.8]
[4.0,9.6]
[1.3,10.6]
[0.6,9.5]

[21.4,33.4]
[33.8,37.9]
[35.5,49.3]

3.60
3.10
6.00

33.10**
40.00**

[30.8,35.5]
[36.6,43.5]

29.10**
59.10**

[27.1,31.2]
[55.1,63.0]

Untaxed

Counterfeit

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

29.00**
19.20**
18.20**
21.80**
32.50**
51.40**

[25.7,32.4]
[16.6,22.1]
[15.1,21.9]
[17.7,26.6]
[23.1,43.6]
[37.9,64.7]

21.00**
19.50**
16.10**
16.30**
20.40**
51.60**

[18.2,24.1]
[16.6,22.8]
[13.1,19.7]
[12.8,20.5]
[13.6,29.5]
[38.0,64.9]

[1.7,7.6]
[2.4,3.9]
[3.4,10.3]

13.60**
23.40**
34.30**

[9.5,19.1]
[21.6,25.2]
[27.8,41.4]

9.30**
19.70**
29.90**

[6.3,13.6]
[18.0,21.5]
[23.6,37.2]

3.60
2.60

[2.8,4.8]
[1.8,3.9]

20.60**
27.20**

[18.6,22.7]
[24.2,30.5]

15.50**
26.80**

[13.8,17.4]
[23.7,30.2]

3.20
4.20

[2.4,4.1]
[2.9,6.0]

17.50**
45.10**

[15.8,19.3]
[41.2,49.1]

13.80**
40.50**

[12.3,15.5]
[36.6,44.6]

**
Pearson chi-square test statistic for independence of factors and responses has p-value less than 0.05.
Chi-square p-value less than 0.01.
For list of premium brands, see footnote Error! Bookmark not defined..
‡
Category includes those who mostly roll their own cigarettes and those who have no usual brand preference of pre-packaged cigarettes.
Note: Estimates are for the percentage of smokers in the subpopulation defined by the row heading for which the variable in the column heading equals one.
*
†
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Table 4: Demographic factors and association with tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP, I
NoStamp1
NoStamp2
Loosies
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18 - 20
21 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 - 74
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Other
Education
Less than high school
High school
College
Higher/profess’l degree
Income
Less than $25,000
$25-50,000
$50-$75,000
More than $75,000
Declined to state

*Pearson

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

6.10
7.50

[4.6,8.2]
[5.9,9.4]

32.70
29.90

[29.6,36.1]
[27.1,32.9]

5.40**
4.20**
4.00**
4.90**
7.70**
11.80**
7.80**

[1.4,19.3]
[2.2,7.7]
[2.8,5.7]
[3.2,7.6]
[5.1,11.6]
[8.2,16.7]
[3.5,16.4]

14.90**
34.10**
26.30**
32.20**
31.00**
35.80**
42.90**

5.60
7.20
7.20
6.10
8.80
13.20

[4.3,7.4]
[4.0,12.7]
[4.6,11.1]
[3.5,10.6]
[3.6,19.8]
[7.5,22.3]

7.80
6.70
7.40
4.20
7.50
7.40
5.60
5.30
19.30

PriceTooLow

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

0.50
0.70

[0.3,1.0]
[0.3,1.7]

12.40**
7.70**

[10.8,14.2]
[6.4,9.4]

[7.1,28.6]
[26.2,42.9]
[22.7,30.2]
[27.8,36.9]
[26.0,36.5]
[30.1,42.0]
[32.5,53.8]

1.80
1.80
1.00
0.30
0.30
0.20
0.00

[0.4,7.0]
[0.4,7.4]
[0.5,2.1]
[0.1,0.8]
[0.1,1.0]
[0.0,1.2]

16.20**
16.40**
13.20**
10.50**
8.70**
5.40**
9.70**

[9.3,26.6]
[12.3,21.4]
[11.2,15.6]
[8.4,13.1]
[6.3,11.7]
[3.6,8.2]
[5.4,16.8]

28.70*
40.90*
33.60*
34.40*
19.50*
28.80*

[25.9,31.6]
[32.8,49.5]
[28.4,39.2]
[27.5,42.0]
[10.0,34.8]
[20.4,38.8]

0.10**
2.20**
1.20**
0.00**
0.00**
0.40**

[0.1,0.4]
[0.8,5.9]
[0.6,2.4]
[0.1,1.6]

11.00
8.20
10.60
11.90
12.90
6.80

[9.5,12.6]
[5.1,12.9]
[8.2,13.4]
[8.4,16.6]
[5.8,26.0]
[3.8,11.9]

[2.0,26.4]
[5.4,8.3]
[5.1,10.7]
[2.4,7.4]

31.30
30.20
38.40
34.80

[16.5,51.2]
[27.7,32.9]
[33.4,43.5]
[29.4,40.6]

2.90
0.50
0.70
0.30

[0.4,18.0]
[0.3,0.9]
[0.3,1.4]
[0.1,1.3]

11.60**
9.10**
12.50**
23.80**

[4.4,27.1]
[7.8,10.5]
[10.1,15.4]
[20.3,27.7]

[5.4,10.3]
[4.9,10.9]
[3.6,8.5]
[3.6,7.5]
[4.3,56.1]

32.60
30.80
29.70
32.10
22.90

[28.5,37.1]
[26.2,35.8]
[25.0,34.8]
[28.3,36.1]
[6.4,56.6]

1.10*
0.30*
0.20*
0.40*
2.50*

[0.5,2.5]
[0.1,0.9]
[0.1,1.1]
[0.2,0.9]
[0.3,16.2]

7.90**
9.80**
9.90**
14.30**
5.10**

[5.9,10.5]
[7.6,12.7]
[7.8,12.5]
[12.3,16.6]
[1.7,14.1]

** Chi-square p-value less than 0.01.
chi-square test statistic for independence of factors and responses has p-value less than 0.05.
Note: Estimates are for the percentage of smokers in the subpopulation defined by the row heading for which the variable in the column heading equals one.
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Table 5: Demographic factors and association with tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP, II
TaxAvoidance
TaxEvasion
Untaxed
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18 - 20
21 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 - 74
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Other
Education
Less than high school
High school
College
Higher/profess’l degree
Income
Less than $25,000
$25-50,000
$50-75,000
More than $75,000
Declined to state

Pop.
estimate

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

41.60**
26.80**

[39.0,44.3]
[24.5,29.2]

4.60**
1.60**

[3.5,5.9]
[1.1,2.3]

42.40**
50.20**
44.90**
39.30**
26.00**
26.90**
25.90**

[31.6,53.9]
[43.5,56.8]
[41.5,48.4]
[35.5,43.3]
[22.1,30.3]
[22.5,31.9]
[19.0,34.3]

4.40
3.70
3.70
3.40
3.70
2.20
3.10

33.90**
29.30**
39.10**
46.70**
46.70**
31.00**

[31.6,36.3]
[23.4,35.9]
[34.8,43.5]
[40.4,53.1]
[29.1,65.2]
[23.8,39.4]

41.10**
30.30**
47.20**
72.10**
25.90**
30.20**
35.10**
49.50**
52.00**

Counterfeit

95% CI

Pop.
estimate

95% CI

27.80**
17.10**

[25.5,30.3]
[15.1,19.3]

22.60**
15.50**

[20.4,25.0]
[13.5,17.7]

[1.6,6.9]
[1.9,3.3]
[2.5,9.4]
[2.2,4.0]
[2.2,6.9]
[1.2,3.3]
[1.2,9.4]

43.70**
43.00**
34.20**
23.80**
14.10**
11.90**
10.10**

[32.8,55.2]
[36.6,49.7]
[30.9,37.6]
[20.7,27.3]
[11.1,17.8]
[8.7,16.1]
[5.4,18.1]

34.30**
38.70**
32.00**
23.20**
11.10**
5.70**
1.60**

[24.2,46.1]
[32.2,45.6]
[28.6,35.5]
[19.8,27.1]
[8.4,14.5]
[3.5,9.2]
[0.6,4.6]

2.70**
1.90**
5.10**
4.10**
14.90**
0.50**

[2.1,3.7]
[0.8,4.3]
[3.4,7.6]
[2.3,7.1]
[2.8,51.7]
[0.2,1.4]

21.10**
27.00**
27.90**
24.80**
40.00**
16.80**

[19.2,23.2]
[21.1,33.9]
[24.1,32.1]
[19.9,30.4]
[22.1,61.0]
[10.9,25.2]

16.60**
24.50**
23.90**
24.40**
14.40**
14.80**

[14.8,18.5]
[18.8,31.3]
[20.2,28.0]
[19.2,30.5]
[6.4,29.5]
[10.4,20.6]

[26.1,58.1]
[28.2,32.5]
[43.3,51.2]
[67.2,76.6]

2.80
2.80
5.50
6.00

[0.4,17.2]
[2.1,3.8]
[3.9,7.7]
[4.0,9.1]

42.40**
19.70**
26.90**
52.50**

[26.9,59.5]
[17.9,21.6]
[23.6,30.6]
[47.7,57.3]

51.80**
16.70**
19.00**
41.30**

[34.7,68.5]
[15.0,18.5]
[16.3,22.1]
[36.9,46.0]

[22.6,29.5]
[26.5,34.3]
[31.0,39.5]
[46.2,52.9]
[31.5,71.9]

1.70**
2.70**
4.70**
5.00**
3.30**

[1.0,2.8]
[1.5,4.8]
[2.9,7.6]
[3.7,6.8]
[0.5,17.8]

19.50**
19.50**
22.70**
31.20**
16.40**

[16.5,23.0]
[16.4,23.1]
[19.2,26.6]
[28.3,34.4]
[5.6,39.2]

19.50*
16.20*
18.20*
22.90*
33.40*

[16.4,23.0]
[13.4,19.6]
[15.0,21.8]
[20.3,25.7]
[14.0,60.8]

**
Pearson chi-square test statistic for independence of factors and responses has p-value less than 0.05.
Chi-square p-value less than 0.01.
Note: Estimates are for the percentage of smokers in the subpopulation defined by the row heading for which the variable in the column heading equals one.
*
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Figure 1: Past behavior regarding tax evasion, tax avoidance, and ITTP
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Note: data are weighted to reflect the population of adult smokers in California

25

